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cessfully bear the heavy burden, however, will not be penalized by an arbi-
trary disallowance. He can attempt to show the merits of his particular claim
and will be judged thereon. If he chooses to contest a decision by the Com-
missioner, he does so with full knowledge of the difficulty.
The practice ofmedicine is continually changing with the increased accumu-
lation of knowledge. A provision for tax relief must be sufficiently flexible
to keep pace with these changes. The current definition of medical care,
when applied by using the general tests, allows for such changes. As long as
the purpose of the tax relief is to aid those afflicted with unusual medical
burdens, the attainment of that goal should not be inhibited by a provision
which may withhold the relief from the most burdened taxpayers.
FORUM-SHOPPING IN THE REVIEW OF NLRB ORDERS
A party who the National Labor Relations Board finds has committed an
unfair labor practice may seek review of the Board's order in a United States
Court of Appeals,' or the Board itself may petition a court of appeals to
obtain judicial sanction for its order.2 The purpose of this comment is to
explore the possibility of forum-shopping, 3 especially with respect to an appeal
by an aggrieved party,4 and to determine the extent to which forum-shopping
is practiced.
I
The accompanying chart comprises all cases decided by the courts of
appeals from January, 1955, through November, 1960,5 in which the NLRB
brought enforcement proceedings or an aggrieved party appealed a final Board
order. The cases are tabulated with reference to the aggrieved party: an
employer, a union or both.6 A court's action with reference to each category
161 Stat. 148-49 (1947) (amended by 72 Stat. 945 (1958)), 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1958),
hereinafter referred to as section 10(0, the section designation of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
2 61 Stat. 147-48 (1947) (amended by 72 Stat. 945 (1958)), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958),
hereinafter referred to as section 10(e), the section designation of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
3 For the purposes of this comment, the term "forum-shopping" is applied whenever an
appeal is taken to a court of appeals in a circuit other than where the unfair labor practice
occurred, or where the aggrieved party has his principal place of business. In these situations,
it will be assumed that the primary reason for the choice of forum is convenience.
4 An aggrieved party can be one against whom an order of the Board is issued, one who
has had a complaint dismissed by the Board, or one who is partially in either category. See
e.g., Kovach v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1956); American Newspaper Publisher's
Ass'n v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1951); Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 652 (7th Cir.
1950). Compare Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 169
(1st Cir. 1959).
5 WsT FEDERAL REPORTER, SECOND Saiuas, 218 F.2d to 284 F.2d.
6 Included in the category "orders against both" are those cases in which the Board's
final order remedied only a portion of the alleged unfair labor practices for which the com-
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of aggrieved parties is recorded as either enforcing the order, denying enforce-
ment or enforcing the order as modified by the court.7
Over an extended period of time and a large number of cases, the probabili-
ty is that each circuit will have considered substantially similar substantive
issues of labor law. It is felt, therefore, that the tabulation of a large number
of cases, coupled with a comparison of the cumulative results reached, will
furnish a statistical guide to the "attitude" of one circuit relative to another.
Relative attitudes of the courts should indicate whether forum-shopping would
be profitable.
The chart evidences the attitude of a court in two ways. One is in the rela-
tive weight given to the Board's order without regard to which party is bene-
fitted by the order.S A comparison of attitudes indicates that the Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits and the District of Columbia,
where Board orders are enforced in full in approximately one-half of the
cases, furnish the most favorable forums for an aggrieved party. On the other
hand, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Eighth and Tenth Circuits,
where Board orders are enforced in full more than two-thirds of the time,
afford the Board its best chance of obtaining enforcement.
Secondly, the chart indicates which forum is relatively advantageous for
an appeal by either an employer or union. Thus, the Courts of Appeals for
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits are much more favorable to an employer than
are the Second and Third Circuits. On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals
for the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia are the most favorable
forums for a union review petition. 9
Research has indicated that the judicial attitudes inferable from the chart
plaint was filed and dismissed the remainder. In the case of such a "partial" order, both the
complainant and the party against whom the order was issued are aggrieved. Both thus have
standing to appeal the Board's action, as is the case when the order is against both union
and employer. See, e.g., Superior Derrick Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960);
Local 67, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But cf. NLRB v.
Englander Co., 237 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1956).
7 Section 10(e). The court has jurisdiction "to make and enter a decree enforcing, modi-
fying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the
Board." Similar provision is made in section 10(0. If an order was set aside only in part,
it is recorded as modified by the court.
8 A similar method of comparing treatment accorded Board orders in the various circuits
was used by Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945
(1958).
The cases in each circuit in which enforcement was denied and those in which an order
was enforced as modified are combined in one total, which can then be compared with the
total in which an order was enforced in full. Since a modification differs only in degree from
a denial of enforcement, the benefit to an aggrieved party of either result, as opposed to
enforcement in full, is clear.
9 Although no combined total is shown, here also the total number of cases enforced in
full should be compared with the total number of cases in which an order was denied en-
forcement or enforced only as modified.
do not vary as a function of the procedual setting in which the cases are pre-
sented. Whether the aggrieved party or the Board is the petitioner, the cumu-
lative results in each circuit are similar. The chart was simplified by not
classifying the cases according to procedural setting.
Several limitations of the tabulation should be noted. The substantive
issues of labor law involved in the cases have not been examined. Therefore,
no valid conclusions can be drawn regarding possible differences among the
circuits in their application of substantive law. Nor will the factual situation
of a particular case necessarily evoke a court's generally favorable attitude,
which is evidenced only cumulatively over a large number of cases. Also, no
criticism of a particular court of appeals can be made on the basis of the
chart. The substantive issues in individual cases will determine whether court
A is "wrong" for denying enforcement more often than court B; or, whether
B is "wrong" for not denying enforcement as often as A.10 Similarly, an in-
quiry into the underlying reasons for the clearly divergent results among the
circuits is outside the scope of this comment." For present purposes, the fact
that the results have been different is sufficient.
II
Before an aggrieved party can enjoy the advantage of a more favorable
forum, the venue provisions of section 10(f)12 must be met:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States
Court of Appeals in a circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was
alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business,
or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia .... 13
10 If the assumption that cumulative statistics will annul any difference in substantive
issues decided by the various circuits is incorrect, perhaps both A and B are "right."
11 Cooper, supra note 8, suggests that the courts of appeals differ in their application
of the substantial evidence test enunciated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951), and NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1951). Cf. Jaffe, Judicial Re-
view: Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record, 64 HAv. L. Rav. 1233, 1239 (1951); the
opinion of L. Hand, J., in NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir.
1951) (on remand from the Supreme Court): The intent of Congress was "to prescribe an
attitude in courts of appeal less complaisant towards the Board's findings than had been
proper before; not only were they to look to the record as a whole, but they were to be less
ready to yield their personal judgment on the facts; at least less ready than many at times
had been." The cases which make up the present chart, however, were not all cases in which
the substantial evidence rule was controlling, since many turned on purely legal questions.
12 See Comment, 8 STAN. L. REv. 472 (1956), for an extensive analysis of this venue
provision, together with citations to relevant congressional history. For present purposes,
only a brief summary is necessary to indicate the possibilities for forum-shopping which
are available.
13 61 Stat. 148-49 (1947), as amended, 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958).
Substantially similar venue provisions govern appeals from other administrative agencies.
See, e.g., 72 Stat. 795 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(b) (1958) (CAB); 52 Stat. 831 (1938), as
amended, 72 Stat. 946 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §717r(b) (1958) (FPC); 52 Stat. 1028 (1938), as
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In an enforcement proceeding under section 10(e), the Board has the same
choice of venue, except that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
is not available as an independent forum.14
On its face, section 10(f) provides only three alternative forums: the situs
of the unfair labor practice, the District of Columbia or the circuit wherein
the aggrieved party "transacts business."' 5 The number of available forums,
however, is greatly increased by the latitude of the phrase "transacts busi-
ness." If an enterprise maintains a relatively minor storage depot in a circuit
geographically removed from its principal office, it transacts business there
for the purpose of laying venue. 16 Indeed, the enterprise need have no physical
facility in the circuit; it is sufficient if orders are solicited and goods are shipped
to dealers there.17 In view of these broad venue provisions, the possibility of
more than one court reviewing the same NLRB order is ever-present. A
Board order against both employer and union 8 raises the problem in its
most acute form. Both parties then have a right to appeal the order. This
situation affords the possibility of at least three proceedings in three different
circuits: by the employer and union on appeal, and by the Board for enforce-
ment.
Prior to 1958 there was no statutory provision to cover the situation where
more than one proceeding was instituted seeking review of the same Board
order. The judiciary, however, had worked out a procedure to meet the
problem. The court in which the NLRB filed the transcript of the Board
hearings obtained exclusive jurisdiction of the entire controversy,19 even
though one or more aggrieved parties had previously appealed in another
amended, 72 Stat. 942 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1958) (FT); 41 Stat. 492 (1920), as
amended, 54 Stat. 912 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1958) (ICQ). There is a significant differ-
ence, however, in the provisions for the CAB and FPC: the requirement is for appeal in
the circuit of the person's "principal place" of business, rather than merely where he
"transacts business."
14 61 Stat. 147-48 (1947), as amended, 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958).
15 Conceivably, if an unfair labor practice occurred in the District of Columbia, and
that were the only place in which the employer (assuming that he is the aggrieved party)
transacted business, then there would be no choice involved. This must, however, be the
rare situation.
16 Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951). Cf. NLRB v. Texas Independ-
ent Oil Co., 232 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
1 7 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927), relied on
in NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 83 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1936). Cf. Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Nor is the usefulness of the phrase lim-
ited to employers. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 167 (2d
Cir. 1960).
18 Fifty-seven such orders have been the subject of court of appeals action since 1955.
See, e.g., Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1960) (partial order);
NLRB v. Turner Constr. Co., 227 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1955).
19 ILGWT v. NLRB, 225 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
circuit. The court in which the appeal had been originally filed transferred the
case to the court chosen by the Board, and both proceedings were consoli-
dated in one action.20
In 1958, to promote simplicity and uniformity in the procedure of appeals
from all administrative agency decisions,21 sections 10(e) and 10(f), plus the
provisions for appeal from twenty-one other administrative agencies, were
amended,22 and section 2112 was added to Title 28.23 The new legislation
removed the power to choose the forum from the NLRB. If proceedings are
instituted in more than one circuit with respect to the same order, the Board
must file the record in the court in which a proceeding was first instituted.
"The other courts in which such proceedings are pending shall thereupon
transfer them to the court of appeals in which the record has been filed."24
Section 2112 further provides that "for the convenience of the parties and
in the interest of justice such court [which has obtained exclusive jurisdiction
of the proceedings] may thereafter transfer all the proceedings with respect to
such order to any other court of appeals."25 The extent to which this remedial
forum non conveniens provision26 will obviate the possibility of forum shop-
20 See NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 124 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1941); Stanolind Oil & Gas
Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1940); Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 743 (8th
Cir. 1940) (All three cases were concerned with the same unfair labor practices, which
occurred in the Tenth Circuit, where the Board filed the record); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1936); Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co. v.
NLRB, 84 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1936) (memorandum decision); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 83 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1936). (All three cases were concerned with the
same unfair labor practices, which occurred in the Fourth Circuit; the Board, however,
filed the record in the Second Circuit).
21 "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to save time and expense by permitting
the several courts of appeals to adopt rules authorizing the abbreviation of the transcript
and other parts of the record made before Federal administrative agencies when the orders
of those agencies are to be reviewed by the courts of appeals." S. REP. No. 2129, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
22 72 Stat. 941 (1958).
23 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1958).
24 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1958).
25 Ibid. As originally introduced, the 1958 bill would have given statutory blessing to the
method already in use by which the Board determined the forum by filing the record, subject
to a limitation that the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice be considered.
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 25, at 1
(1956). To avoid anticipated abuse of agency discretion, the bill was amended and passed
in its present form. Id. at 13; H. REP. No. 842, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1957).
Congressional anticipation of agency abuse, however, is not supported by NLRB action
from 1955 to 1958. In only one instance since 1955 has the Board petitioned outside the
circuit wherein the unfair labor practice occurred. Further, from 1955 until the new provi-
sions became effective in 1958, there was no instance of the Board choosing to file a tran-
script of the record in a circuit other than the one in which a review petition had already
been filed.
26 It is possible that forum non conveniens was available to the courts in NLRB cases
prior to 1958, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958). Cf. United States v. National City Lines,
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ping is still open to speculation. Thus far, only one reported case has been
transferred from the circuit in which a review petition was first filed.27
HI
Despite the opportunities which are available, and the apparent difference
in attitude among the circuits, there is surprisingly little forum shopping in
actual practice. Of the 563 cases tabulated for this comment, 411 were section
10(e) enforcement proceedings by the Board. Only one of these was taken to
a court of appeals outside of the circuit in which the unfair labor practice
occurred. 28
Of the remaining 152 cases, 89 were appeals by aggrieved employers. Only
13 were appealed in a circuit other than where the unfair labor practice
occurred. The basis for five of these appeals can reasonably be interpreted
as convenience, since they were taken in the circuit in which the employer had
its principal place of business. 29 Eight of the employer appeals, however,
Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949). But the applicability of sec-
tion 1404(a) to NLRB proceedings was never expressly decided. Prior to its enactment, the
doctrine was rejected in NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 124 F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir.
1941). See generally, Kaufman, Observations On Transfers Under Section 1404(a) of the New
Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 605-07 (1950); 1 BARRON & HoLTzonF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PRocEDuRE § 87 (1960). Cf. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Norwood v. Kirk-
patrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
27 Local 2674, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 4 CCH LAB. REL. REP.
(41 L.C.) 16580 (Sept. 16,1960). The employer, Butcher Boy Refrigerator Door Company,
against whom the Board's order was entered, intervened in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, where the complainant-union had petitioned for review, and re-
quested the court to transfer the case to the Seventh Circuit. Pointing out that neither em-
ployer nor union carried on activities in the District of Columbia and that all of the events
in the case occurred in the Seventh Circuit, the company asserted that the union had only
two reasons for petitioning in the District: to harass the employer by causing additional
expense and to obtain a favorable forum. Brief for the Intervenor, pp. 5-7. The employer
noted in passing that there was doubt that the union was even an aggrieved party, since the
Board's order granted relief from all of the important unfair practices alleged in the union's
complaint to the NLRB. Id. at 8.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not cite section 2112 as authority
for granting the employer's motion to transfer the case to the Seventh Circuit. Since, how-
ever, the forum non conveniens provision of section 2112(a) furnished the thrust of the
employer's arguments, it is probable that the court acted under that section.
28 NLRB v. Perry, 244 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1957). Perry operated a small sawmill in Chama,
New Mexico, where the unfair labor practices occurred. There is nothing in the report of
the case or in the trial examiner's report (IR-(SF)-385 (1955)) to indicate the basis of the
jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit.
Of the 411 cases, 30 in the Eighth Circuit and 3 in the Sixth were enforced by memoran-
dum opinions, with nothing to indicate the situs of the unfair labor practices. For the pur-
pose of this comment, it is assumed that all were enforced in the circuit in which the prac-
tices occurred.
29 Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1960) (unfair labor
practices in Florida); National Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1960)
(unfair labor practices in California); United Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, 272 F.2d 446
(7th Cir. 1959) (unfair labor practices in Pennsylvania); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB
appear to have been based on expected secondary advantages from the forum
selected: two cases were taken to the Seventh Circuit and one to the Fifth.30
These circuits appear to be the most favorable to employers. The other five
cases were appealed in the District of Columbia, where Board orders are
treated (statistically) with less deference than in the circuits where the alleged
unfair practices occurred. 31
The remaining 63 cases involved union appeals. Forty-one of these were
appealed in a circuit other than the one where the unfair labor practice
occurred: one in the Second Circuit, which appears to have been for reasons
other than convenience,32 and forty in the District of Columbia. 33 The Second
and District of Columbia Circuits appear to be relatively the most favorable
for a union appeal. In fourteen of the cases before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia appellants maintained their principal offices in the
261 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1958) (unfair labor practices in Pennsylvania); A. M. Andrews Co.
v. NLRB, 236 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1956) (unfair labor practices in Illinois).
The attorney for Allis-Chalmers has stated that his reason for appealing to the Seventh
Circuit was convenience. Letter from John H. Kamps to The University of Chicago Law
Review, Feb. 4, 1961, on file in The University of Chicago Law Library.
30 Celanese Corp. of America v. NLRB, 279 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1960) (unfair labor prac-
tices and principal place of business in West Virginia); Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. NLRB,
274 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1960) (unfair labor practices in Pennsylvania, principal place of busi-
ness in New York); General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 222 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1955) (unfair
labor practices in New York, principal places of business in New York and Michigan).
The attorney for Sunshine Biscuits has stated that his reason for appealing to the Seventh
Circuit was his belief that the "case was indistinguishable from [Miller Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959)]." He thought that the "chances for a more favorable
ruling were much greater before a court that had passed on the problem." Letter from
David B. Buerger to The University of Chicago Law Review, Feb. 7, 1961, on fie in The
University of Chicago Law Library.
31 Puerto Rico S.S. Ass'n v. NLRB, 281 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (unfair labor practices
and principal place of business in Puerto Rico); Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd. v. NLRB,
274 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (unfair labor practices and principal place of business in
Hawaii); News Printing Co. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (unfair labor practices
and principal place of business in New Jersey); Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (unfair labor practices and principal place of business in California);
Union Mfg Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (unfair labor practices and princi-
pal place of business in Maryland).
32 National Maritime Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960).
The court had jurisdiction because petitioners (two unions) had offices and did business
in the Second Circuit. Id. at 169. The unfair labor practices occurred in the Seventh Circuit.
The union offices maintained in the Second Circuit do not appear to be the main offices,
although their exact location has not been determined.
33 The unfair labor practices in these cases occurred as follows: 1st Circuit, 0; Second
Circuit, 3; Third Circuit, 1; Fourth Circuit, 3; Fifth Circuit, 9; Sixth Circuit, 6; Seventh
Circuit, 6; Eighth Circuit, 2; Ninth Circuit, 6; Tenth Circuit, 3. In Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), the unfair labor practice had no particular
situs. The union is the bargaining agent for all of Prudential Insurance Company's district
agents.
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District; 34 the purpose of these appeals can reasonably be termed con-
venience. In the remaining twenty-six, however, the union's principal office
was in another circuit. The selection of the District of Columbia, therefore,
appears to have been motivated by expected advantages from the forum.
Thus, 35 of the 152 petitions for review of Board orders appear to have
involved shopping for a more favorable forum. Since all of the 563 Board
orders which comprise the accompanying chart could have been appealed by
the aggrieved parties, the number which actually involved forum-shopping
is relatively small. There are several possible explanations for this phenome-
non. It has been suggested that the financial burden involved in an appeal is
an important factor which negates any advantage to be gained from forum-
shopping.35 This contention, however, is valid only as an argument against
appeals in general, not against forum-shopping in particular. It might explain
why only 152 appeals were taken from 563 appealable orders. It does not ex-
plain the existence of only 35 cases of forum-shopping.36
The apparent absence of forum-shopping may be better explained, although
still only partially, by another factor. When an employer is aggrieved by a
Board order with respect to an unfair labor practice which arises in either the
Fifth or Seventh Circuits, there is no reason for him to seek another forum.
Since the Board uniformly (only one exception) brings enforcement proceed-
ings in the circuit in which the practice occurred, the employer will automati-
cally be in one of the two circuits which are most favorable to him. Thus, in
the 123 orders against employers arising from unfair labor practices in these
two circuits, 37 one would not expect to find a change of forum. An aggrieved
employer in either the Fifth or Seventh Circuits would have to appeal a Board
order only if a union were also aggrieved, in order to forestall a possible union
appeal to another circuit.
An explanation for the absence of forum-shopping in the Fifth Circuit may
lie in the antipathy evinced by the court of appeals in the only case of forum-
shopping in that circuit since 1955:
34 The location of the principal offices of the union-appellants is taken from INma-
NATIONAL LABOR DIREcTORY & HANDBOOK (1955).
35 Humphrey, The National Labor Relations Board and the Courts, N.Y.U. 8TH ANNuAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 121, 132-35 (1955). Humphrey's main argument is directed to the
advantage of waiting for the Board to bring enforcement proceedings, thus avoiding certain
costs of appeal, such as the requirements that the petitioner furnish the transcript of record.
36 Indeed, Humphrey, supra note 35, at 135 n.7, seems to recognize this in a concluding
statement that is somewhat inconsistent with her thesis: "Of course where the respondent
[aggrieved party] has substantial operations in various circuits, especially where the conduct
complained of occurred in more than one locale, it may be worthwhile to get into a more
advantageous court before the Board selects another." The basis for the assumption that
there may exist "a more advantageous court" is not enunciated.
37 This is the total number of cases in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in which an em-
ployer was an aggrieved party, minus the number of appeals with respect to unfair labor
practices which occurred outside of the circuits.
Basing jurisdiction on the alleged fact that petitioner does business in both Florida
and Georgia within the Fifth Circuit, this action was brought here in spite of the
fact that the petitioner is a Delaware corporation with its plant and the situs of
operations out of which the proceeding arises, were all located and took place in
the Second Circuit.38
The critical attitude displayed may offset any advantage which might be
gained from the court's general employer-oriented attitude. The Courts of
Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits and the District of Columbia,
the only other circuits in which forum-shopping was found, have not shown a
similar antipathy, 39 although if any of these courts were faced with a case of
obvious forum-shopping, such antipathy might appear.
There is another possible explanation for the failure to practice forum-
shopping on a wider scale. Certain courts of appeals evince attitudes more
favorable to the Board, an employer or a union. The overall attitude of a
court, however, may not control a particular case. For example: the Board
determines that an employer committed an unfair labor practice in the Eighth
Circuit; the employer also transacts business in the Seventh Circuit; the
Seventh appears more favorable to him as an employer, but the Eighth has
recently decided in his favor a case "on all fours" with the order against him.
The employer's attorney will not be inclined to forum-shop.4 0 In cases where
a choice of forum is available, the existence of a controlling precedent will
dictate the choice; but when there is no decision in any circuit directly in
point, the general attitude of a court may still be decisive. 41
IV
As noted above, the number of cases in which forum-shopping was actually
practiced is relatively small when compared with the total number of cases
considered by the courts of appeals. If some of the explanations for this
phenomenon are valid, the significance of the number of forum-shopping
cases is increased. In any event, thirty-five examples of the practice seem
sufficient to justify consideration of possible changes in the liberal venue pro-
38 General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 222 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1955) (Board's order
affirmed). In accord with this attitude is Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613, 614 n.1
(5th Cir. 1951): "Its [petitioner's] plant is situated at New Haven, Connecticut [the situs
of the unfair labor practice].... The Board concedes that this Court has jurisdiction over
the instant proceeding because petitioner happens to have a warehouse in Houston, Texas."
39 In view of the express statutory permission to appeal to the District of Columbia, such
an attitude would not be expected by that court of appeals.
40 A case "on all fours," however, may also be the controlling factor which leads to fo-
rum-shopping. See letter from David B. Buerger, supra note 30.
41 A final explanation for the dearth of forum-shopping lies in the possibility that attor-
neys simply are not aware that certain forums are more favorable than others. A limited
sampling of practicing attorneys' opinions, given off-the-record, indicates that this is gener-
ally not the case.
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visions of sections 10(e) and 10(f), which supposedly are available for the
convenience of the litigants.42
Apart from the number of cases, the problems inherent in those cases in
which more than one party is aggrieved 43 are indicative of the need to limit
the presently available choices of forums. Two cases which have not yet re-
ceived final court of appeals action (and thus are not included in the tabula-
tion of cases) are illustrative. In the Butcher Boy case,44 the employer ap-
pealed to the Seventh Circuit. The union, however, had previously petitioned
in the District of Columbia to give that circuit exclusive jurisdiction of the
case. 45 Butcher Boy Refrigerator Door Company is a small business in
Illinois, in the Seventh Circuit, where the alleged unfair labor practices
occurred. The complaining union, the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Join-
ers, has its principal office in Indiana, also in the Seventh Circuit. Clearly the
Seventh Circuit would afford the most convenient forum for all of the parties.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia transferred the
case, at the instigation of the employer, to the Seventh Circuit. 46
The second case involves a Board order against the Kohler Company.47
The Board dismissed a major portion of the complaint of the United Auto
Workers, so that both employer and union were aggrieved parties. The com-
pany's plant is located in Wisconsin, in the Seventh Circuit, where all of the
alleged unfair labor practices occurred. The principal office of the UAW is
in Michigan, in the Sixth Circuit. On the facts of the case, only the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits can reasonably be viewed as convenient for all parties.
Within thirty minutes after the Board issued its order, however, the UAW
filed a petition for review in the District of Columbia. The company con-
sumed only ninety minutes in petitioning for review in the Seventh Circuit.48
42 Cf. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 and Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 29 (1947) (statement of Judge Phillips
concerning a bill to amend appellate procedure from the ICC and FCC); Hearings on S.
1567 and H.R. 1639 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1948) (a bill to amend the FELA venue provisions); Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 25, at 14 (1956) (statement of
Representative Crumpacker concerning the proposed Section 2112 of Title 28).
43 Cf. text accompanying note 18 supra; text following note 37 supra.
44 Butcher Boy Refrigerator Door Co. v. NLRB, 127 N.L.R.B. - (No. 160) (1960).
45 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1958). The Seventh Circuit transferred the employer's
appeal to the District of Columbia. 4 CCH LAB. REL. REP. (41 L.C.) 16557 (Sept. 21,
1960).
46 Local 2674, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners; 4 CCH LAB. REL. REP. (41 L.C.)
16580 (Sept. 16, 1960). The Seventh Circuit subsequently accepted jurisdiction. Butcher
Boy Refrigerator Door Co. v. NLRB, 4 CCH LAB. REL. REP. (41 L.C.) 16581 (Oct. 7,
1960).
4 7 Kohler Co. v. Local 833, UAW-AFL-CIO, 128 N.L.R.B. - (No. 122) (1960).
48 This information was supplied in a letter from Francis E.Hickey, member of the Illinois
bar, to the University of Chicago Law Review, Feb. 3, 1961, on file in The University of
Chicago Law Library.
For an account (somewhat less than favorable to the union and the NLRB) of the back-
A more farcical illustration of the extremes to which overly permissive venue
leads is hard to imagine. If this race for a favorable forum were the sole in-
stance of forum-shopping, reappraisal of the venue provisions would be
justified.
Although the present forum non conveniens provision of section 2112 may
prove capable of curtailing such abuses, there is no apparent reason to place
the entire burden of choosing proper venue on the courts of appeals. Minor
changes in the present provisions would almost entirely remove the burden
from the courts, and also virtually eliminate the abuses which wide choice of
venue makes possible. It has been proposed that appeals from an order of the
NLRB be available only in the court of appeals for the circuit where the
unfair labor practice occurred. 49 To confine the choice of venue within such
narrow limits, however, seems neither necessary nor desirable. Forum-shop-
ping, as the term has been used in this comment, does not occur when an
appeal is taken in the circuit where the unfair labor practice occurred or where
the aggrieved party has its principal place of business. The definition seems
justified by the rationale behind allowing any choice of venue: convenience
of the parties. Pursuant to this definition of forum-shopping, the venue provi-
sions should be redrafted to allow an appeal only in the circuit wherein the
unfair labor practices occurred or in the circuit wherein the aggrieved party
has its principal place of business. The forum non conveniens provision
should be retained, although it should rarely be needed. The phrase "transacts
business," with its potential for abuse, should be omitted, as should the alter-
native choice of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.50 In a
particular case, abuse of the provisions even as thus limited is conceivable.
But any change must be weighed against the convenience of the parties. It is
submitted that the availability of the forum where the practice occurs or
where the aggrieved party maintains its principal place of business adequately
provides for this convenience, and at the same time minimizes abuse.5 1
ground of the Kohler strike and the subsequent Board order, See P TRo, THE KOHLER
STRiKE (1961).
49 Note, 8 STAN. L. REV. 472 (1956). This note also favored a forum non conveniens pro-
vision to allow a court of appeals thereafter to transfer the case to another circuit.
50 No justification for this alternative forum has been discovered. Since it is presently
available only to aggrieved parties, convenience for the NLRB, which sits in Washington,
D.C., is not a factor. Nor is any benefit to aggrieved parties apparent.
51 Another method by which forum-shopping could be limited is to eliminate the appar-
ent divergency among the circuits in their treatment of NLRB findings of fact. Cf. Cooper,
supra note 8, where the "clearly erroneous" test is suggested as an alternative to the "sub-
stantial evidence" test presently in use. A slight change in the venue provisions appears to
be a much easier remedy. Also, if there is in fact a difference in "attitude" among the cir-
cuits, more is necessary than a mere verbal alteration of the test to be applied to factual
findings. Cf. Jaffe, supra note 11, at 1239.
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